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By the end of the nineteenth century, however, the first privatization movement gave way 
to politics as land management decisions were taken over by federal agencies. Especially 
the U.S. Forest Service and the Bureau of Land Management inherited a massive federal 
estate under the guise of scientific management to encourage multiple uses in the public 
interest. Commonly known as public lands, the federal estate is more appropriately 
thought of as political lands, for it is raw politics that has dominated land management 
especially at the federal level.
Following the American Revolution, the Founding Fathers recognized that privatizing the 
federal estate provided a way of generating revenues and of encouraging efficient 
resource use. Hence the first wave o f privatization lasted for nearly a century (see 
Anderson 1987). Over that time the mechanisms of privatization changed from wholesale 
to retail marketing and finally to homesteading. The process of privatization often 
involved extra-legal institutions that reduced the inefficiencies of top-down rules and 
regulations (see Anderson and Hill 1986 and Libecap 1983).
Increasingly it is clear that political land management does not generate efficiency, 
equity, or environmental quality and therefore that we should considering going “back to 
the future” through privatization. Free market environmentalism (Anderson and Leal 
1991) stresses the importance of getting the incentives rights for good resource 
stewardship, and privatizing the federal estates offers the best hope for doing this. Sale, 
lease, transfers to states, and outright giveaways can eliminate multiple conflicts over 
multiple users (Anderson 1994) and bring fiscal stability to federal land management. 
Introduction
A. To understand the history of federal land policy it is useful to consider the 
perspectives of the decision makers from their perspectives.
B. In other words, sometimes we can gain perspective by wearing different hats.
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III. The first privatization movement-perspectives from a colonist’s hat
A. The founding fathers faced two problems:
1. Distributing the public domain
2. Balancing the federal budget
B. Solving these problems led to privatization of the federal estate first through 
wholesale marketing and later through retailing small parcels to individuals.
C. The first privatization movement culminated with land “giveaways” under a 
variety of acts generally knows as the homestead acts.
D. These giveaways resulted in a costly race to obtain land, the costs of which were 
only mitigated by local informal and often extra-legal customs.
IV. Public lands or political lands—perspectives from a cowboy hat
A. The federal estate was established in the late nineteenth century under the guise of 
scientific management.
1. Arguments for reserving land centered around inefficient private use.
2. But the evidence does not support this claim, especially in the context of 
resource constraints of the time.
B. Establishment of the federal estate substitute politics for private decision making.
C. And it is politics fuels “multiple conflicts of multiple uses.”
V. Getting the incentives right-perspectives from an economist’s hat
A. Recently Souder and Fairfax (1995, 41) wrote that “For decades, economists have 
urged critics of public resource management to embrace market mechanisms as a 
route to reform both the incentives managers face and the subsidies resources 
receive.”
B. Though I doubt we could find many references dated before the 1980s that really 
advocate market mechanism and especially privatization, there is abundant 
literature regarding the inefficiency regarding the tragedy of the commons and the 
tragedy of politics.
VI. Free market environmentalism—perspectives from an environmentalist’s hat
A. I (1982) first referred to this as the “new resource economics,” but today it is 
perhaps better known as “free market environmentalism.”
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B. Briefly, free market environmentalism has three major themes.
1. Politics subsidizes destruction of the environment more than it protects it, 
and in the process often redistributes income.
2. Markets generate economic growth that is positively related to 
environmental quality.
3. Private ownership provides the basis for this growth and for good resource 
stewardship.
C. Two general principles emerge from these themes.
1. Devolve the authority for management to the lowest common denominator 
which means minimizing externalities and agency costs.
2. Make those with authority to manage lands accountable for their actions 
through “profits” (see Leal 1995).
D. What are the policy implications that follow from these principles?
1. At a minimum charge fees and allow managers to keep a share of those 
fees for reinvestment in the lands under their control.
2. When assets are put up for lease, allow all potential users to bid.
3. Utilize long-term leasing and make the leases transferable to other uses.
4. Privatize federal lands starting with the easy ones such as those mainly for 
commodity production.
5. If there is a public goods (free-rider) problem associated with certain 
aspects of land management, establish funds allocated through a process 
similar to the National Science Foundation (but definitely not through 
usual political mechanisms) available to private producers of the public 
goods.
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